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The	  Turing	  Test.	  Turing	  set	  the	  agenda	  for	  (what	  would	  eventually	  be	  called)	  the	  cognitive	  sciences.	  He	  said,	  essentially,	  that	  cognition	  is	  as	  cognition	  does	  (or, more 
accurately, as cognition is capable of doing):	  Explain	  the	  causal	  basis	  of	  cognitive	  capacity	  and	  you’ve	  explained	  cognition.	  Test	  your	  explanation	  by	  designing	  a	  machine	  that	  can	  do	  everything	  a	  normal	  human	  cognizer	  can	  do	  –	  and	  do	  it	  so	  veridically	  that	  human	  cognizers	  cannot	  tell	  its	  performance	  apart	  from	  a	  real	  human	  cognizer’s	  –	  and	  you	  really	  cannot	  ask	  for	  anything	  more.A	  machine?	  Isn’t	  that	  already	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms?	  Only	  if	  you	  have	  biassed	  preconceptions	  about	  machines.	  For	  “machine”	  merely	  means	  a	  dynamical	  system	  governed	  by	  causality.	  On	  that	  score,	  we	  too	  are	  machines	  -­‐-­‐	  for	  everyone	  except	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  our	  biology	  somehow	  transcends	  ordinary	  causality,	  and	  that	  “mind	  over	  matter”	  is	  somehow	  an	  extra,	  spontaneous	  force	  in	  the	  universe.	  (We	  will	  not	  take	  up	  this	  notion	  till	  the	  very	  end	  of	  this	  essay.)So	  we	  are	  machines,	  and	  Turing	  simply	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  is	  therefore	  our	  mission	  to	  Wind	  out	  the	  kind	  of	  machine	  we	  are,	  by	  explaining	  how	  the	  machine	  works.	  His	  own	  hunch	  may	  have	  been	  wrong.	  He	  thought	  that	  we	  were	  mainly	  computers,	  and	  that	  cognition	  is	  computation.	  So,	  he	  thought,	  the	  task	  would	  simply	  be	  to	  Wind	  the	  right	  computer	  program	  –	  the	  one	  that	  can	  pass	  the	  “Turing	  Test”	  -­‐-­‐	  able	  to	  do	  anything	  we	  can	  do,	  indistiguishably	  from	  the	  way	  we	  do	  it.	  
Searle’s	  Chinese	  Room.	  The	  celebrated	  thought-­‐experiment	  in	  which	  the	  philosopher	  John	  Searle	  does	  all	  the	  computations	  of	  the	  computer	  program	  that	  successfully	  passes	  the	  Turing	  Test	  [T2]	  in	  Chinese	  demonstrates	  that	  cognition	  cannot	  “be	  as	  cognition	  does”	  if	  the	  doing	  consists	  solely	  of	  being	  able	  to	  communicate	  by	  email	  in	  Chinese	  indistinguishably	  from	  a	  real	  Chinese	  cognizer	  (even	  if	  tested	  for	  a	  lifetime)	  -­‐-­‐	  not,	  at	  least,	  if	  the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  T2	  success	  is	  generated	  is	  just	  computation.	  For	  computation	  is	  implementation-­‐independent:	  if	  computation	  can	  really	  do	  something,	  it	  can	  do	  that	  same	  thing	  no	  matter	  how	  you	  implement	  it	  physically.	  And	  when	  Searle	  does	  the	  computation	  that	  produces	  the	  
T2-­‐passing	  success	  in	  Chinese,	  he	  is	  implementing	  the	  very	  same	  computer	  program	  –	  yet	  he	  is	  not	  understanding	  Chinese.	  So	  no	  computer	  running	  the	  same	  program	  understands	  either.How	  does	  Searle	  know	  he	  is	  not	  understanding	  Chinese?	  After	  all,	  his	  is	  just	  a	  thought-­‐experiment.	  No	  one	  yet	  has	  actually	  written	  a	  computer	  program	  that	  can	  pass	  T2	  for	  a	  lifetime.	  Yet	  we	  all	  know	  that	  the	  way	  to	  learn	  Chinese	  is	  to	  learn	  Chinese,	  not	  to	  learn	  and	  execute	  a	  computer	  program	  that	  manipulates	  symbols	  whose	  meanings	  we	  do	  not	  understand,	  and	  manipulates	  them	  purely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  shapes,	  and	  not	  their	  meaning.	  For	  that	  is	  what	  computation	  is,	  and	  does.	  And	  Searle	  rightly	  points	  out	  that	  he	  (or	  anyone	  or	  anything	  else	  implementing	  the	  same	  computer	  program)	  would	  merely	  be	  manipulating	  meaningless	  symbols	  under	  those	  conditions,	  not	  understanding	  what	  the	  Chinese	  symbols	  mean,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  doing	  so	  for	  a	  lifetime	  –	  despite	  all	  appearances	  to	  their	  native	  Chinese	  pen-­‐pals.How	  is	  Searle	  able	  to	  make	  this	  judgment	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  implementation	  of	  a	  non-­‐existent	  computer	  program?	  Let’s	  set	  aside	  deeper	  worries	  such	  as	  whether	  there	  could	  ever	  be	  such	  a	  successful	  T2-­‐passing	  computer	  program	  aa	  well	  as	  shallower	  worries,	  such	  as	  whether,	  even	  if	  there	  were,	  Searle	  could	  actually	  do	  all	  the	  symbol	  manipulations	  himself.	  A	  fundamental	  question	  is:	  How	  would	  Searle	  know	  whether	  he	  was	  understanding	  Chinese?	  If	  the	  program	  was	  really	  performing	  at	  T2-­‐scale,	  for	  a	  lifetime,	  then	  if	  the	  lifelong	  Chinese	  email	  interlocutor	  asked	  Searle	  (in	  Chinese)	  whether	  he	  understood	  Chinese,	  the	  reply	  (in	  Chinese)	  would	  of	  course	  have	  to	  be	  something	  like:	  “What	  an	  absurd	  question!	  Haven’t	  you	  and	  I	  been	  communicating	  in	  Chinese	  for	  the	  past	  40	  years?”Yet,	  when	  asked,	  in	  English,	  whether	  he	  understood	  Chinese,	  Searle	  would	  reply	  (quite	  truthfully)	  that	  he	  couldn’t	  understand	  a	  word;	  he	  was	  just	  faithfully	  doing	  the	  requisite	  symbol	  manipulations,	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  he	  had	  memorized,	  for	  the	  past	  40	  years.	  It	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  making	  that	  judgment	  –	  that	  he	  does	  not	  understand	  Chinese	  –	  to	  which	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  attention	  here,	  because	  it	  really	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter.	  For	  it	  calls	  into	  question	  Turing’s	  thesis	  that	  “cognition	  is	  as	  cognition	  does”	  –	  at	  least	  insofar	  as	  language	  speaking	  (in	  this	  case,	  writing)	  and	  understanding	  are	  concerned.	  Searle	  is	  indeed	  able	  to	  do	  what	  Chinese	  speakers/understanders	  are	  able	  to	  do,	  indistinguishably	  from	  them.	  He	  has	  all	  their	  know-­‐how.	  Yet	  he	  says	  he	  is	  not	  understanding	  Chinese:	  What’s	  missing?	  And	  how	  does	  he	  
know	  it’s	  missing?What’s	  missing	  is	  what	  it	  feels	  like	  to	  be	  able	  to	  speak	  and	  understand	  Chinese.	  And	  Searle	  knows,	  because	  he	  is	  the	  only	  one	  who	  can	  know	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  can	  speak	  and	  understand	  Chinese,	  i.e.,	  know	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  has	  that	  feeling,	  regardless	  of	  anything	  else	  he	  does	  or	  can	  do.	  (We	  will	  elaborate	  on	  this	  again,	  below.)Is	  this,	  then,	  the	  death-­‐knell	  for	  Turing’s	  thesis	  that	  “cognition	  is	  as	  cognition	  does”?	  So	  far,	  this	  applies	  only	  to	  the	  very	  special	  case	  of	  language	  speaking/understanding,	  and	  only	  if	  the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  T2	  success	  is	  accomplished	  is	  via	  computation	  alone	  (symbol	  manipulation).
The	  Robotic	  Turing	  Test.	  But	  was	  the	  language-­‐only	  Turing	  Test,	  T2,	  really	  the	  one	  Turing	  intended	  (or	  should	  have	  intended)?	  After	  all,	  if	  the	  essence	  of	  Turing’s	  “cognition	  is	  as	  cognition	  does”	  criterion	  is	  Turing-­‐indistinguishability	  from	  what	  a	  human	  cognizer	  can	  do,	  then	  a	  human	  cognizer	  can	  certainly	  do	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  just	  
produce	  and	  understand	  language.	  A	  human	  cognizer	  can	  do	  countless	  other	  kinds	  of	  things	  in	  the	  real	  world	  of	  objects,	  actions,	  events,	  states	  and	  traits,	  and	  if	  the	  T2	  candidate	  could	  not	  do	  all	  those	  kinds	  of	  things	  too,	  then	  that	  incapacity	  would	  be	  immediately	  detectable,	  and	  the	  candidate	  would	  fail	  the	  test.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  do	  all	  those	  things	  successfully,	  the	  T2	  candidate	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  just	  a	  computer:	  It	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  sensorimotor	  robot,	  capable	  of	  sensing	  and	  acting	  upon	  all	  those	  objects,	  etc.	  -­‐-­‐	  again	  Turing-­‐indistinguishably	  from	  the	  way	  real	  human	  cognizers	  do.	  Now	  Turing	  is	  to	  be	  forgiven	  for	  having	  chosen	  symbol	  input/output	  capability	  as	  the	  paradigm	  for	  his	  T2,	  for	  at	  least	  three	  reasons:	  (1)	  computation	  is	  very	  powerful	  and	  general;	  it	  can	  simulate	  and	  approximate	  just	  about	  any	  other	  physical	  process.	  (2)	  Language,	  too,	  is	  very	  powerful	  and	  general;	  it	  can	  describe	  in	  words	  just	  about	  any	  object,	  action,	  event,	  state	  and	  trait.	  (3)	  Restricting	  T2	  to	  email	  interactions	  rules	  out	  the	  irrelevant	  factor	  of	  physical	  appearance,	  which	  might	  bias	  our	  judgment:	  Turing’s	  criterion	  is	  “cognition	  is	  as	  cognition	  does”:	  cognitive	  capacity	  indistinguishable	  from	  our	  own.	  Not:	  “it	  must	  look	  just	  like	  any	  of	  us.”But	  some	  of	  our	  cognitive	  capacities	  do	  depend	  on	  things	  that	  cannot	  be	  tested	  by	  the	  standard	  “email”	  version	  of	  the	  Turing	  Test,	  T2	  .	  People	  are	  able	  not	  only	  to	  name,	  describe	  and	  reason	  about	  objects,	  actions,	  events,	  states	  and	  traits	  in	  the	  world;	  they	  can	  also	  recognize,	  identify,	  manipulate	  and	  otherwise	  interact	  with	  them	  in	  the	  world.	  So	  the	  candidate	  has	  to	  be	  a	  robot,	  not	  just	  an	  email	  pen-­‐pal.	  In	  fact,	  without	  the	  sensorimotor	  capacities	  of	  a	  robot,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  even	  the	  email	  T2	  could	  be	  passed	  successfully:	  Would	  it	  not	  arouse	  immediate	  suspicion	  if	  our	  pen-­‐pal	  was	  always	  mute	  about	  photos	  we	  sent	  via	  snail-­‐mail?	  And	  is	  there	  any	  way	  to	  give	  a	  credible	  description	  of	  what	  anything	  feels	  like	  without	  ever	  having	  seen,	  touched,	  heard	  or	  felt	  anything?So	  chances	  are	  that	  even	  to	  be	  able	  to	  pass	  the	  email	  version	  of	  the	  Turing	  Test,	  T2,	  the	  candidate	  would	  probably	  have	  to	  have,	  and	  draw	  upon,	  the	  capacity	  to	  pass	  the	  robotic	  version	  of	  the	  Turing	  Test	  too:	  Let’s	  call	  robotic	  Turing	  Test	  T3.	  T2	  –	  which	  is	  just	  language-­‐in/language-­‐out	  –	  simply	  draws	  on	  and	  tests	  T3	  capacity	  indirectly.	  Perhaps	  Turing	  never	  meant	  that	  the	  candidate	  could	  only	  be	  a	  computer,	  computing.	  Computing	  is	  just	  the	  manipulation	  of	  meaningless	  symbols,	  based	  on	  rules	  operating	  on	  the	  shapes	  of	  the	  symbols.	  The	  shapes	  of	  the	  symbols	  are	  arbitrary	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  things	  that	  the	  symbols	  are	  interpretable	  (by	  those	  who	  understand	  what	  they	  mean)	  as	  referring	  to.	  Even	  for	  those	  who	  understand	  English,	  the	  string	  of	  symbols	  “the	  apple	  is	  red”	  does	  not	  resemble	  apples,	  red,	  or	  apples	  being	  red.	  For	  Searle,	  in	  the	  Chinese	  room,	  the	  same	  sentence,	  in	  Chinese,	  would	  not	  even	  mean	  “the	  apple	  is	  red.”	  It	  would	  (as	  Searle	  insisted,	  memorably)	  only	  be	  a	  meaningless	  series	  of	  “squiggles”	  and	  “squoggles.”
Symbol	  Grounding.	  What	  makes	  English	  meaningful	  to	  Searle?	  We	  know	  Searle	  can	  pass	  T2	  in	  English;	  he	  can	  pass	  T3	  in	  English	  too.	  And,	  for	  the	  reasons	  we’ve	  mentioned,	  it’s	  unlikely	  that	  he	  could	  pass	  T2	  in	  Chinese	  without	  also	  having	  the	  
ability	  to	  pass	  T3	  in	  Chinese;	  and	  he	  cannot	  do	  that,	  because	  he	  has	  no	  idea	  what	  the	  symbols	  mean.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  thought	  experiment	  of	  being	  able	  to	  pass	  T2	  through	  symbol	  manipulation	  alone	  was	  probably	  a	  Wiction	  all	  along:	  it	  can’t	  be	  done.	  But	  we	  still	  haven’t	  said	  what	  makes	  English	  meaningful	  to	  Searle.	  His	  English	  symbols	  refer	  to	  objects,	  actions,	  events,	  states	  and	  traits	  in	  the	  world;	  and	  Searle	  can	  recognize,	  identify,	  manipulate	  and	  otherwise	  interact	  with	  those	  objects,	  etc.,	  including	  being	  able	  to	  name,	  describe	  and	  reason	  about	  them	  –	  in	  English.	  Let’s	  call	  that	  know-­how:	  Searle	  –	  or,	  rather,	  Searle’s	  brain	  -­‐-­‐	  has	  the	  know-­‐how	  to	  pass	  T2	  and	  T3	  in	  English.	  Sensorimotor	  capacities	  are	  not	  computational	  but	  dynamic,	  so	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  producing	  this	  know-­‐how	  must	  be	  dynamic	  (i.e.,	  analog),	  rather	  than	  just	  computational	  (i.e.,	  digital,	  symbolic).	  And	  hence	  cognition	  is	  not	  just	  computation.	  Let	  us	  say	  that	  unlike	  his	  Chinese	  symbols,	  Searle’s	  English	  symbols	  are	  “grounded”	  in	  his	  sensorimotor	  capacity	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  things	  in	  the	  world	  that	  his	  symbols	  refer	  to:	  they	  connect	  his	  words	  to	  their	  referents.	  Is	  sensorimotor	  grounding	  the	  same	  as	  meaning,	  then?	  Can	  we	  be	  certain	  that	  a	  T3-­‐passing	  robot	  would	  really	  mean	  what	  it	  said?
The	  Cogito.	  Well	  perhaps	  certainty	  is	  a	  bit	  too	  much	  to	  ask.	  We	  already	  know	  from	  Descartes	  that	  we	  can	  be	  certain	  about	  the	  necessary,	  provable	  truths	  of	  mathematics	  but	  apart	  from	  that	  (with	  one	  prominent	  exception	  we	  will	  get	  to	  in	  a	  minute),	  there’s	  no	  certainty.	  We	  can’t	  even	  be	  certain	  about	  the	  laws	  of	  physics:	  They	  are	  just	  highly	  probably	  true.	  We	  can’t	  be	  certain	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  outside	  world;	  it’s	  just	  highly	  probable.	  Same	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  people,	  and	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  other	  people	  think:	  Highly	  probable,	  not	  certain.	  So	  what	  does	  that	  matter?	  Maybe	  certainty	  is	  something	  that	  one	  can	  only	  have	  in	  the	  formal	  world	  of	  mathematics.	  After	  all,	  things	  are	  true	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  of	  objects	  and	  people	  too,	  and	  we	  can	  know	  them;	  it’s	  just	  that	  we	  can’t	  know	  them	  for	  sure.	  But	  Descartes	  also	  pointed	  out	  another	  certainty,	  one	  that	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  the	  very	  opposite	  pole	  from	  the	  certainties	  of	  the	  abstract	  world	  of	  mathematics:	  We	  can	  also	  be	  sure	  that	  we	  think	  (Descartes’	  celebrated	  “Cogito”).	  It’s	  impossible	  to	  doubt	  you’re	  thinking,	  because	  doubting	  is	  thinking.	  That	  sounds	  like	  a	  trick,	  so	  let’s	  put	  it	  in	  a	  more	  intuitive	  way:	  When	  I’m	  feeling	  something,	  I	  can’t	  doubt	  that	  I’m	  feeling	  something.	  I’m	  feeling	  whatever	  I’m	  feeling.	  When	  I	  have	  a	  toothache,	  I	  can	  doubt	  that	  it’s	  really	  my	  tooth	  that’s	  ailing.	  Maybe	  it’s	  referred	  pain	  from	  an	  eye	  infection.	  Maybe	  I	  have	  no	  tooth	  at	  all;	  it’s	  been	  extracted.	  Worse,	  maybe	  it’s	  really	  true	  that	  there’s	  no	  outside	  world,	  and	  that	  my	  body	  and	  everything	  else	  is	  just	  an	  illusion,	  a	  dream!	  But	  what	  I	  can’t	  doubt	  is	  that	  it	  feels	  like	  something	  when	  I’m	  feeling	  something:	  Whether	  or	  not	  I	  have	  an	  aching	  tooth,	  it	  feels	  like	  something	  (as	  it	  happens,	  a	  toothache),	  when	  I	  have	  a	  toothache.	  And	  that’s	  a	  certainty.	  Feeling	  is	  a	  certainty	  (when	  you’re	  feeling).	  Whenever	  you’re	  feeling	  something,	  	  something	  is	  being	  felt,	  without	  a	  doubt.	  Whatever	  it	  feels	  like,	  that’s	  what	  is	  being	  felt,	  without	  a	  doubt.	  Things	  may	  not	  be	  what	  they	  feel	  like	  (an	  injured	  tooth),	  but	  they	  certainly	  feel	  like	  whatever	  they	  like	  (a	  toothache),	  whilst	  they’re	  being	  felt.
Meaning.	  Now	  back	  to	  the	  question:	  Is	  grounding,	  then,	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  meaning?	  
Can	  we	  be	  certain	  that	  a	  grounded	  T3-­‐passing	  robot	  would	  really	  mean	  what	  it	  said	  (or	  that	  it	  would	  really	  be	  meaning	  anything	  at	  all)?At	  the	  very	  least,	  we	  now	  know	  that	  if	  the	  robot	  does	  mean	  what	  it	  says,	  we	  can’t	  be	  certain	  that	  it	  means	  what	  it	  says,	  for	  roughly	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  we	  can’t	  even	  be	  sure	  there’s	  a	  robot	  there,	  or	  an	  outside	  world.	  But	  let’s	  set	  that	  aside	  as	  idle	  sceptical	  fretting.	  Is	  it	  any	  worse,	  with	  the	  robot’s	  meaning,	  than	  it	  is	  with	  the	  outside	  world	  existing,	  or	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  physics?	  Is	  it	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  settling	  for	  high	  probability	  rather	  than	  insisting	  on	  certainty?Turing	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  just	  that:	  The	  reason	  we	  should	  trust	  the	  TT	  is	  because	  it’s	  no	  better	  or	  worse	  than	  what	  we	  have	  with	  one	  another:	  We	  can’t	  be	  sure	  anyone	  else	  means	  what	  they	  say,	  or	  that	  they	  mean	  anything	  at	  all	  (or	  even	  that	  they	  exist).	  We	  can	  only	  be	  sure	  about	  ourselves	  –	  and	  even	  there,	  all	  I	  can	  really	  be	  sure	  of	  is	  that	  when	  I	  say	  something	  meaningful,	  it	  feels	  as	  if	  I	  know	  what	  I	  mean.	  I	  may	  be	  jabbering	  nonsense	  that	  is	  not	  at	  all	  what	  I	  mean	  to	  be	  saying.Back	  to	  Searle	  in	  the	  Chinese	  room.	  He	  says	  he	  doesn’t	  have	  any	  idea	  what	  he	  is	  saying	  when	  he	  manipulates	  the	  Chinese	  symbols.	  He	  does	  not	  know	  what	  (if	  anything)	  all	  of	  those	  symbols	  he	  is	  manipulating	  mean.	  Can	  we	  take	  him	  at	  his	  word?	  After	  all,	  to	  the	  Chinese	  speaker	  with	  whom	  he	  has	  been	  corresponding	  for	  40	  years	  in	  Chinese,	  he	  certainly	  looks	  and	  acts	  like	  someone	  who	  means	  to	  say	  what	  he	  says,	  and	  knows	  what	  he	  means.But	  we’ve	  decided	  to	  give	  Searle	  the	  beneWit	  of	  the	  doubt,	  for	  Cartesian	  reasons:	  Maybe	  Searle	  sometimes	  talks	  nonsense	  when	  he	  feels	  he’s	  saying	  something	  meaningful.	  We	  can	  all	  understand	  that.	  We	  all	  do	  that	  sometimes.	  But	  what	  about	  the	  reverse:	  Can	  he	  be	  saying	  something	  meaningful	  when	  he	  feels	  he’s	  talking	  nonsense?	  For	  40	  years	  straight,	  non-­‐stop?	  Surely	  –	  and	  I	  really	  mean	  surely	  here	  –	  something	  is	  amiss	  if	  something	  like	  that	  happens.	  If	  someone	  speaks	  in	  tongues	  –	  tongues	  that	  he	  says,	  honestly,	  he	  doesn’t	  understand	  –	  and	  what	  he	  says	  in	  those	  tongues	  nevertheless	  makes	  consistent	  sense,	  then	  what	  we	  conclude,	  quite	  naturally,	  is	  that	  he	  must	  be	  suffering	  from	  multiple	  personality	  disorder:	  But	  multiple	  personality	  is	  a	  pathology,	  and	  the	  personalities	  usually	  only	  emerge	  one	  at	  a	  time.	  	  Searle,	  in	  contrast,	  has	  an	  explanation:	  “I’m	  just	  manipulating	  symbols	  according	  to	  rules;	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  what	  it	  means.”	  And,	  moreover,	  his	  explanation	  is	  all	  true.So	  we	  cannot	  escape	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Searle	  is	  the	  only	  sure	  arbiter	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  understands	  or	  means	  anything,	  when	  he	  is	  transmitting	  and	  receiving	  Chinese.	  He	  can	  say,	  with	  Cartesian	  certainty,	  that	  he	  is	  not	  understanding	  or	  meaning	  anything	  at	  all.For	  over	  three	  decades	  now,	  Searle’s	  Chinese	  room	  argument	  has	  been	  debated	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  cognition	  is	  just	  computation.	  But	  here	  I	  want	  to	  refocus	  on	  the	  much	  harder	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  meaning	  is	  just	  know-­‐how.	  We	  are	  no	  longer	  talking	  about	  whether	  computation	  alone	  could	  pass	  T2,	  nor	  whether,	  if	  it	  could,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  candidate	  understood	  
and	  meant	  what	  it	  said.	  We	  are	  at	  T3	  level,	  and	  the	  candidate	  is	  no	  longer	  just	  a	  computer,	  computing,	  but	  a	  robot,	  a	  dynamical	  system,	  doing	  not	  only	  computation,	  but	  also	  sensorimotor	  transduction,	  and	  perhaps	  a	  lot	  of	  other	  essential	  internal	  dynamic	  processes	  in	  between	  as	  well.Unlike	  Searle,	  who	  tells	  us,	  honestly,	  that	  he	  has	  no	  idea	  what	  the	  squiggles	  he	  is	  receiving	  and	  sending	  refer	  to,	  the	  T3-­‐passing	  robot	  shows	  us	  that	  he	  does	  know,	  by	  pointing	  out	  their	  referents,	  and	  interacting	  with	  the	  real	  world	  of	  objects,	  etc.,	  indistinguishably	  from	  any	  of	  us.	  His	  words	  square	  with	  his	  deeds,	  just	  as	  any	  of	  ours	  do.	  So	  is	  Turing	  right	  that	  to	  ask	  for	  anything	  more	  than	  T3	  is	  not	  only	  impossible,	  but	  unreasonable,	  since	  we	  have	  nothing	  more	  to	  go	  on	  when	  we	  are	  mind-­‐reading	  one	  another	  either?
The	  Brain.	  But	  is	  there	  nothing	  more?	  Might	  there	  be	  (1)	  something	  more	  to	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  testing	  for	  with	  the	  T3?	  And	  might	  there	  be	  (2)	  something	  more	  to	  test	  with	  than	  T3?	  The	  answer	  to	  both	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  is	  yes.	  In	  testing	  know-­‐how	  with	  T3,	  we	  are	  not	  just	  testing	  for	  know-­‐how,	  we	  are	  testing	  for	  meaning	  (1).	  We	  realized	  that	  T2	  	  (i.e.,	  meaningless	  symbols	  in,	  meaningless	  symbols	  out,	  symbol-­‐manipulation	  in	  between)	  was	  not	  even	  enough	  to	  test	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  symbols	  were	  grounded	  in	  their	  referents.	  The	  connection	  had	  to	  be	  made	  through	  the	  mediation	  of	  the	  mind	  of	  an	  external	  interpreter,	  whereas	  our	  robot	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  making	  its	  own	  connections	  to	  its	  referents,	  autonomously.	  T3	  Wixed	  that.	  It	  grounded	  symbols	  in	  the	  robot’s	  capacity	  for	  sensorimotor	  interactions	  with	  the	  referents	  of	  its	  symbols,	  at	  full	  T3	  scale,	  for	  a	  lifetime.	  But	  does	  robotic	  indistinguishability	  from	  any	  of	  us	  mean	  total	  indistinguishability?This	  is	  the	  point	  at	  which	  those	  who	  have	  been	  burning	  to	  bring	  the	  brain	  into	  this	  discussion	  all	  along	  can	  remind	  us	  that,	  after	  all,	  although	  we	  don’t	  actually	  test	  it	  when	  we	  are	  mind-­‐reading	  one	  another	  every	  day,	  the	  presumption	  is	  that	  what	  makes	  us	  all	  pretty	  much	  the	  same	  is	  not	  just	  that	  we	  behave	  indistinguishably	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  that	  we	  all	  have	  roughly	  the	  same	  brains	  (2).	  So	  there	  is,	  in	  principle,	  a	  Turing	  Test	  that	  is	  even	  more	  exacting	  than	  T3,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  neurobehavioral	  Turing	  Test,	  T4:	  The	  candidate	  must	  be	  totally	  indistinguishable	  from	  us	  not	  only	  in	  its	  verbal	  performance	  capacity	  (T2)	  and	  its	  sensorimotor	  performance	  capacity	  (T3)	  but	  also	  in	  its	  neurobehavioral	  performance	  capacity.	  After	  all,	  what	  the	  brain	  does	  internally	  is	  just	  as	  observable	  (especially	  today,	  in	  the	  era	  of	  brain	  imagery)	  as	  what	  the	  body	  does	  externally.	  Why	  would	  any	  good	  empirical	  scientist	  want	  to	  ignore	  observable	  data?We	  will	  return	  to	  T4	  	  in	  a	  moment.	  But	  Wirst,	  regardless	  of	  which	  TT	  we	  use,	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  pass	  the	  TT	  surely	  isn’t	  an	  operational	  deWinition	  of	  having	  a	  mind.	  We	  are	  trying	  to	  infer	  something	  from	  having	  the	  know-­‐how	  to	  pass	  the	  TT.	  What	  are	  we	  trying	  to	  infer?	  The	  TT	  itself	  is	  direct	  evidence	  of	  having	  that	  know-­‐how,	  but	  that’s	  all.	  What	  else	  is	  there,	  besides	  the	  know-­‐how?
Feeling.	  We’re	  back	  to	  Searle	  (and	  Descartes),	  and	  what	  only	  Searle	  can	  know,	  and	  that	  is	  that	  it	  feels	  like	  something	  to	  say	  something	  and	  mean	  something	  by	  it.	  Of	  course,	  it	  also	  feels	  like	  something	  –	  for	  a	  real	  person,	  like	  Searle	  -­‐	  to	  say	  something	  meaningless;	  and	  indeed,	  it	  feels	  like	  something	  to	  do	  most	  of	  the	  things	  that	  we	  do	  
while	  we’re	  awake	  and	  acting	  voluntarily.	  Any	  feeling	  will	  do,	  but	  here	  we	  use	  for	  our	  example	  the	  case	  of	  what	  it	  feels	  like	  to	  say	  something	  meaningful.	  Only	  the	  speaker	  himself	  can	  know	  for	  sure.	  And	  if	  he	  tells	  me	  that	  he	  means	  what	  he	  says,	  and	  that	  he	  understands	  what	  he	  means,	  I	  take	  him	  at	  his	  word	  (and	  I’m	  right,	  and	  it’s	  true,	  of	  course),	  exactly	  as	  I	  do	  when	  he	  says	  he	  has	  a	  headache.	  So	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  “What	  else	  is	  there,	  besides	  know-­‐how?”	  is	  that	  it’s	  exactly	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  extra	  thing	  that	  there	  is,	  besides	  know-­‐how,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  headache.	  In	  T2,	  the	  know-­‐how	  underlying	  a	  headache	  is	  simply	  to	  be	  able	  to	  state	  that	  you	  have	  a	  headache,	  and	  to	  make	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  discourse	  consistent	  with	  that	  fact.	  In	  T3,	  you	  might	  also	  have	  a	  pained	  expression	  on	  your	  face,	  cradle	  your	  head	  in	  your	  hands,	  and	  react	  in	  an	  uncharacteristically	  abrupt	  way	  when	  touched	  or	  spoken	  to.	  That’s	  headache	  know-­‐how	  too.	  If	  I	  suspect	  you	  are	  faking	  it,	  I	  could	  move	  to	  T4	  and	  request	  a	  brain	  scan.	  (Let’s	  pretend	  brain	  imagery	  is	  so	  advanced	  that	  it	  can	  reliably	  detect	  the	  neural	  correlates	  of	  a	  headache.)	  If	  the	  brain	  scan	  is	  positive,	  can	  I	  be	  sure	  you	  have	  a	  headache?	  As	  sure	  as	  I	  can	  be	  of	  other	  empirical	  truths,	  like	  apples	  falling	  down	  rather	  than	  up,	  F	  =	  ma,	  and	  there’s	  a	  real	  world	  out	  there.But	  is	  Turing	  right	  that	  if	  it’s	  not	  Searle’s	  headache	  that’s	  in	  question,	  but	  the	  headache	  of	  a	  T3	  robot,	  then	  I	  can	  be	  equally	  conWident?	  Certainly	  not	  via	  T2.	  Is	  T3	  enough?	  Or	  do	  I	  need	  T4?	  We	  normally	  only	  invoke	  brain	  scans	  and	  lie	  detectors	  with	  real	  people	  when	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  believe	  they	  may	  be	  lying.	  The	  robot	  is	  T3-­‐indistinguishable	  from	  us.	  Do	  I	  really	  need	  T4	  to	  conWirm	  he	  has	  a	  headache	  when	  he	  says	  he	  does,	  even	  if	  he	  otherwise	  behaves	  exactly	  like	  a	  person	  whom	  I	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  was	  lying,	  and	  hence	  I	  wouldn’t	  dream	  of	  ordering	  a	  brain	  scan	  every	  time	  he	  said	  he	  had	  a	  headache?Never	  mind	  headaches.	  What	  about	  meaning?	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  a	  brain	  scan	  for	  meaning,	  but	  suppose	  there	  was	  one.	  Suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  when	  Searle	  said	  he	  could	  not	  understand	  the	  Chinese	  symbols	  that	  he	  was	  receiving	  and	  sending,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  exhibiting	  T2	  know-­‐how,	  a	  scanner	  could	  conWirm	  that	  he	  was	  indeed	  exhibiting	  all	  the	  brain	  correlates	  of	  not	  understanding,	  rather	  than	  understanding.	  But	  now	  suppose	  a	  robot	  –	  not	  	  Searle	  –	  passed	  T3	  and	  failed	  T4.	  Better	  still,	  to	  make	  this	  even	  more	  realistic,	  suppose	  John	  Searle	  himself,	  the	  very	  one,	  in	  California,	  was	  discovered,	  when	  participating	  as	  a	  voluntary	  subject	  in	  his	  Wirst	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  experiment,	  to	  be	  a	  T3	  robot,	  and	  to	  have	  been	  one	  throughout	  his	  lifetime,	  as	  professor,	  relative,	  colleague	  and	  friend.	  How	  conWident	  would	  his	  now	  failing	  T4	  make	  us	  that	  he	  therefore	  had	  not	  meant	  anything	  he	  had	  said	  all	  his	  life?	  Would	  we	  be	  as	  conWident	  as	  we	  were	  when	  the	  ostensibly	  human	  Searle	  had	  assured	  us,	  in	  the	  Chinese	  room,	  that	  he	  was	  not	  meaning	  anything	  when	  he	  communicated	  in	  Chinese?	  But	  in	  that	  hypothetical	  case,	  there	  was	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  why	  Searle	  could	  not	  understand	  the	  Chinese.	  (He	  had	  never	  learned	  it,	  and	  was	  just	  manipulating	  squiggles	  and	  squoggles.)	  Is	  failing	  T4	  like	  that?
Mind-­Reading.	  This	  example	  is	  of	  course	  playing	  with	  our	  mind-­‐reading	  intuitions.	  We	  could	  test	  them	  still	  further.	  Would	  failing	  T4	  make	  us	  conWident	  that	  Searle	  
could	  then	  immediately	  be	  dismembered,	  having	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  just	  a	  mindless	  device,	  perhaps	  to	  have	  his	  components	  studied	  by	  scientists,	  to	  reverse-­‐engineer	  how	  they	  work,	  or	  to	  trace	  who	  had	  built	  him?	  How	  would	  Searle’s	  family	  and	  friends	  feel	  about	  that?Perhaps	  it’s	  not	  fair	  to	  force	  us	  to	  make	  an	  intuitive	  or	  moral	  judgment	  based	  on	  such	  hypothetical	  examples,	  because	  there	  are	  no	  TT-­‐scale	  robots	  –	  T2,	  T3	  or	  T4	  –	  and	  perhaps	  they’re	  not	  even	  possible.	  Perhaps	  only	  a	  biological	  organism	  more	  or	  less	  like	  us	  in	  every	  respect	  could	  pass	  any	  of	  the	  Turing	  Tests,	  and	  if	  it	  could	  pass	  one,	  it	  could	  pass	  them	  all.If	  that	  were	  true,	  then	  Turing’s	  principle	  –	  cognition	  is	  as	  cognition	  does	  –	  would	  still	  be	  correct,	  but	  his	  research	  methodology	  would	  not	  be.	  The	  way	  to	  reverse-­‐engineer	  human	  cognitive	  capacity	  would	  not	  be	  to	  try	  to	  build	  devices	  that	  can	  do	  what	  we	  can	  do,	  but	  to	  study	  the	  brain	  in	  the	  same	  way	  we	  studied	  the	  heart,	  kidneys	  and	  lungs	  –	  all	  biological	  organs	  with	  certain	  functions,	  by	  direct	  observation	  and	  manipulation.The	  trouble	  is	  that	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  brain	  are	  our	  functions.	  What	  hearts,	  kidneys	  and	  lungs	  can	  do	  is	  mainly	  mechanical	  and	  chemical	  –	  pump	  blood	  or	  air,	  Wilter	  Wluids,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  whereas	  what	  brains	  can	  do	  is	  what	  we	  can	  do.	  Their	  know-­‐how	  is	  our	  know-­‐how.	  And	  so	  far,	  computation	  and	  robotics	  have	  been	  the	  only	  ways	  we	  have	  derived	  even	  the	  vaguest	  inklings	  of	  how	  anything	  at	  all	  could	  do	  what	  our	  brains	  can	  do.	  Computational	  and	  robotic	  devices	  are	  so	  far	  toys,	  compared	  to	  us;	  but	  they	  are	  able	  to	  do	  a	  tiny	  fragment	  of	  what	  we	  are	  able	  to	  do.	  In	  contrast,	  neuroscience	  has	  not	  yet	  produced	  a	  causal	  explanation	  of	  anything	  that	  we	  can	  do	  (apart	  from	  “vegetative”	  functions	  such	  a	  temperature	  regulation,	  balance	  or	  breathing,	  which	  are	  more	  like	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  heart	  or	  kidney	  than	  the	  brain).So	  even	  if	  it	  does	  turn	  out	  that	  the	  brain’s	  way	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  produce	  our	  know-­‐how,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  know	  how	  the	  brain	  succeeds	  in	  doing	  	  it	  if	  we	  don’t	  build	  models	  that	  work	  the	  way	  we	  think	  the	  brain	  works,	  to	  test	  whether	  they	  can	  indeed	  do	  what	  the	  brain	  can	  do.	  And	  that	  begins	  to	  look	  more	  and	  more	  like	  the	  Turing	  Test	  again.	  Because	  the	  goal	  of	  cognitive	  science	  is,	  after	  all	  to	  give	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  And	  causal	  explanations	  have	  to	  be	  testable.
Causality	  and	  the	  Explanatory	  Gap.	  Let	  me	  close	  with	  some	  reWlections	  on	  causality,	  by	  returning,	  as	  promised,	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  “mind	  over	  matter.”	  Let’s	  all	  confess	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  formal	  position	  we	  may	  take	  on	  the	  “mind/body”	  problem,	  it	  feels	  like	  something	  to	  have	  a	  mind,	  to	  think,	  to	  cognize;	  and	  that	  something	  does	  not	  feel	  passive.	  Not	  only	  do	  my	  sensory	  experiences	  feel	  like	  something,	  but	  so	  do	  my	  motor	  experiences.	  And	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  voluntary	  actions,	  it	  feels	  like	  I	  do	  what	  I	  do	  because	  I	  feel	  like	  it.	  It	  feels	  like	  I’m	  somehow	  causing	  my	  actions	  by	  “willing”	  them.	  (Don’t	  ask	  me	  what’s	  causing	  my	  willing;	  I’m	  tempted	  to	  say	  “me”	  but	  not	  even	  Descartes	  knows	  what	  that	  really	  means;	  only	  what	  it	  feels	  like.)Now	  this	  is	  not	  really	  a	  digression	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  free	  will.	  It	  is	  just	  a	  closing	  reWlection	  on	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  feeling	  in	  cognition,	  and	  in	  attempts	  to	  explain	  cognition	  causally.	  It	  is	  undeniable	  that	  we	  feel	  (that’s	  Descartes’	  Cogito	  again).	  This	  
essay	  has	  suggested	  that	  our	  inescapable	  uncertainty	  about	  whether	  T2,	  T3	  or	  T4	  successfully	  capture	  and	  explain	  cognition	  turns	  out	  to	  reduce	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  causal	  explanations	  only	  capture	  and	  explain	  know-­‐how,	  or	  they	  also	  capture	  and	  explain	  feeling.	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  causal	  explan	  can	  only	  ever	  capture	  and	  explain	  know-­‐how,	  and	  that	  (just	  as	  Turing	  suggested)	  there’s	  no	  point	  in	  asking	  for	  or	  expecting	  more.	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  arrive	  at	  our	  explanation	  via	  T2,	  T3,	  T4,	  or	  via	  the	  direct	  observation,	  manipulation	  and	  modeling	  of	  brain	  function,	  we	  will	  always	  be	  faced	  with	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  whether	  we	  have	  explained	  all	  of	  cognition,	  or	  just	  our	  know-­‐how.And	  I	  think	  I	  can	  pinpoint	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  cannot	  hope	  to	  do	  any	  better	  than	  that:	  Causal	  explanation	  accounts	  for	  how	  and	  why	  things	  happen	  as	  they	  do,	  and	  account	  for	  it	  causally.	  Causal	  explanation	  of	  cognition	  –	  whether	  it	  is	  based	  on	  designing	  a	  mechanism	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  successfully	  pass	  T2,	  T3,	  or	  T4,	  or	  on	  modeling	  what	  gives	  the	  brain	  its	  T4	  capacity	  –	  will	  always	  be	  open	  to	  the	  usual	  sort	  of	  skepticism	  that	  we	  had	  agreed	  to	  ignore	  as	  not	  worth	  fretting	  about.	  And	  perhaps	  it	  is	  indeed	  not	  worth	  fretting	  about	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  the	  successful	  total	  explanation	  of	  	  our	  know-­‐how	  will	  always	  be	  equally	  compatible	  with	  the	  presence	  or	  the	  absence	  of	  feeling.	  For	  unless	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  be	  telekinetic	  dualists,	  according	  a	  separate,	  unique	  causal	  power	  to	  feeling	  itself	  (“mind	  over	  matter”	  )	  -­‐-­‐	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  evidence,	  only	  overwhelming	  evidence	  against	  it	  –	  there	  is	  no	  causal	  room	  in	  any	  model	  for	  feeling.Yet,	  although	  it	  may	  be	  an	  illusion	  that	  some	  of	  the	  things	  I	  do,	  I	  do	  because	  I	  feel	  like	  it,	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  an	  illusion	  that	  it	  feels	  like	  some	  of	  the	  things	  I	  do,	  I	  do	  because	  I	  feel	  like	  it.	  And	  that	  feeling	  is	  as	  real	  as	  the	  feeling	  that	  I	  have	  a	  toothache	  even	  when	  I	  don’t	  have	  a	  tooth.So	  whereas	  it	  may	  well	  be	  that	  our	  T2,	  T3	  or	  T4	  candidate	  really	  feels	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  surely	  real	  people	  with	  brains	  do	  -­‐-­‐	  nothing	  in	  the	  causal	  explanation	  of	  the	  T2,	  T3	  or	  T4	  know-­‐how	  will	  explain	  how	  or	  why	  we	  feel.	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  this	  is	  because	  feeling	  is	  mystical,	  or	  even	  because	  the	  right	  causal	  explanation	  would	  not	  “capture”	  feeling.	  It’s	  just	  that	  whereas	  causal	  explanation	  explains	  how	  it	  captures	  know-­‐how,	  it	  cannot	  explain	  how	  it	  captures	  feelings.	  And	  whereas	  it	  is	  transparent	  why	  having	  T2,	  T3,	  and	  perhaps	  T4	  know-­‐how	  would	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  Darwinian	  survival	  machines	  that	  we	  all	  are,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  apparent	  how	  or	  why	  having	  feelings	  would	  be.	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